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Transformative Use and
Comment on the Original
THREATS TO APPROPRIATION IN CONTEMPORARY
VISUAL ART
INTRODUCTION
Art and rules do not often go well together. To imagine
an artist pondering the Copyright Act and conforming to case
law as part of the creative process is bizarre if not laughable.
Some United States courts, however, seem to disagree. In March
of 2011, a district court in the Southern District of New York
held that appropriation artist Richard Prince had unlawfully
infringed photographer Patrick Cariou’s copyrighted works
when he tore pages from Cariou’s photography book Yes, Rasta
and used them in collages for his own collection entitled Canal
Zone.1 Prince unsuccessfully argued that his work constituted
fair use—a defense to copyright infringement that deems an
otherwise infringing use to be lawful for policy reasons.2 The
Cariou v. Prince decision is a high profile, yet not
unprecedented,3 reaction to visual art that comments on prior
works through appropriation.
The contemporary concept of appropriation in the visual
arts originated about a century ago with the advent of artists
such as Pablo Picasso and Georges Braque and their use of

1

Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). This past
April, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing in part the
District Court’s decision. Finding that the lower court incorrectly required that the new
work comment on the original, the Court of Appeals determined that twenty-five of the
thirty paintings in the Canal Zone series constitute fair use. While this decision
substantially thaws Judge Batts’ initial ruling, together, the three Cariou opinions, one
from the district court and the two from the Second Circuit, only underscore the need for a
clearer fair use standard. Cariou v. Prince Cariou (II), 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
2
See generally Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 346-47.
3
See Rogers v. Koons, 950 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting pop
artist’s fair use defense despite the use of different medium and evidence of social
commentary in work); Morris v. Guetta, No. LA CV12-00684, 2013 WL 440127, at *13
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) (rejecting street artist’s fair use defense); Friedman v. Guetta,
No. Civ. 10-00014, 2011 WL 3510890, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (same).

1521

1522

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

collage.4 While occasionally throughout the twentieth century
artists have faced copyright claims, these cases have settled for
the most part, with few lasting long enough to set any
legitimate precedent.5 But recently, artists have become
increasingly litigious.6 And many of these modern cases involve
major art world players, such as Shepard Fairey, Ryan McGinley,
and, of course, Richard Prince.7 These wealthy and successful
artists might not face crippling financial consequences by
defending or settling these lawsuits, and they are often
unsympathetic defendants, but the effect of a decision against
one of them could have vast consequences.
The goal of copyright law, under the U.S. Constitution,
is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”8 Too
often, however, in an effort to zealously protect the rights of
authors, courts and litigants lose sight of this end. More
importantly, overprotection of copyright can actually hinder
4

Picasso and Braque are typically associated with the beginnings of
appropriation art for their use of collage in works of art. Clement Greenberg, Collage,
in ART AND CULTURE: CRITICAL ESSAYS 70-71 (1961); see also Timothy Anglin Burgard,
Picasso and Appropriation, 73 ART BULL. 479, 479 (1991) (“[Picasso] perceived
appropriation as a magical transference of power that could be applied to both
historical and contemporary art and to objects and people.”).
5
Cat Weaver, Law vs. Art Criticism: Judging Appropriation Art,
HYPERALLERGIC (May 5, 2011), http://hyperallergic.com/23589/judging-appropriationart/ (“[M]ost copyright infringement cases defer to a ‘tradition of settling’.”). Renowned
pop-artist Andy Warhol faced infringement claims for using another artist’s image of
flowers and for his use of the Campbell’s soup can images, but he wound up settling
both claims out of court. See William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and
Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4 n.10, 18 (2000);
E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1475 n.12, 1484 (1993). The transformative use standard is
derived from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, a case dealing with music sampling. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
6
Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento, Why Is Copyright (Suddenly) a Hot Topic for
Artists?, CLANCCO, (Feb. 19, 2010), http://clancco.com/wp/2010/02/hot-topics-copyrightart/. Mr. Sarmiento argues that the current economic recession, the increased
awareness of the value of visual art, and education about legal rights are all factors
that have contributed to the rise in copyright litigation in recent years. Id.; see also
Randy Kennedy, Apropos Appropriation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2011, at AR1, available
at http://nytimes.com/2012102/01/arts/design/richard-prince-lawsuit-focuses-on-limitsof-appropriation.html (“[A]rt lawyers say that legal challenges are now coming at a
faster pace . . . because the art market has become a much bigger business and because
of the extent of the borrowing ethos.”).
7
Randy Kennedy, Artist Sues the A.P. Over Obama Image, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
9, 2009, at C1; Walter Robinson, Cariou v. Prince: More on Artists’ Copyright Claims,
ARTNET (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/news/robinson/artistscopyright-claims-12-16-11.asp. Not to be forgotten, superstar artist Jeff Koons has
singlehandedly contributed to much of the American case law concerning fair use and
appropriation art. See generally Rogers, 950 F.2d 301, Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244
(2d Cir. 2006), and Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D. N.Y. 2011).
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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progress when too much material is off limits. The fair use
exception is designed to redirect copyright toward its goal by
allowing uses that are desirable. In other words, fair use
applies when the law would otherwise deem a work infringing
that, for policy reasons, should be permitted.9
Determining whether a specific act of copying falls
under fair use involves a four-factor analysis.10 Although courts
examine all four factors,11 the first factor—which considers “the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes”12—is often central to the analysis. In Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,13 the Supreme Court relied on a
Harvard Law Review article written by Judge Pierre N. Leval
to introduce the “transformative” nature of the work as a prong
of the first fair use factor.14 According to Judge Leval, a
transformative work “must be productive and must employ the
quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose
than the original.”15 The transformative use question is now “at
the heart of . . . fair use” claims, particularly those that deal
with appropriation art.16 Moreover, the Supreme Court has

9
10

See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575.
Under § 107, the fair use analysis examines:

(1) the purpose and character of the [allegedly infringing] use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). These four factors provide a guideline for courts to analyze fair
use. However, they are not exclusive or determinative—a point that the Second Circuit
recently made plain in its Cariou decision reversing in part the district court’s finding
that none of Prince’s works constituted fair use. Cariou (II).
11
See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (“All [four factors] are to be explored,
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”) In some areas,
however, doctrine has evolved that favors certain factors over others. One example of
this is the doctrine of transformative use—the central topic of this note. Another is the
emphasis on the second factor in cases where the underlying work is unpublished. See,
e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985); New
Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1989).
12
17 U.S.C. § 107.
13
510 U.S. at 578.
14
See id. at 578-92.
15
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(1990). In the context of this note, the “quoted matter” means the appropriated work.
16
Meir Feder & Rajeev Muttreja, Circuit Addresses Limits of Fair Use in
Visual Art, N.Y. L.J., June 30, 2011; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578; Blanch v.
Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1996); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 34748 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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explained that a finding of transformativeness will render the
other factors less persuasive.17
The long-term dangers of an overly conservative
transformative use (and, by extension, fair use) standard could
drastically affect the art world and contemporary art
movements. If the cost of paying for these lawsuits begins to
outweigh the benefits of using appropriation, then the world’s
most well-known artists might stop employing such practices.18
The fear of facing a copyright infringement claim could have a
chilling, if not silencing, effect on creative expression. It is
important, therefore, to develop a more forgiving standard for
dealing with claims of fair use in the visual arts in order to
discourage litigation and thereby protect artists’ creative
expression. Copyright law should adhere to the Constitutional
purpose set out in Article 1 §8 cl. 8, and explained in greater
detail in Judge Leval’s article, while protecting against
legitimately threatening forms of infringement. A standard
that evaluates whether the new work serves a different artistic
purpose would allow artists the most freedom and still protect
against piracy and counterfeiting.
This note primarily addresses the visual arts.19 In the
context of visual art, current fair use law does not effectively
promote the goals of copyright. Accordingly, for visual art that
incorporates images that would otherwise be infringing, fair
17

See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is not
absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use . . . the goal of copyright, to promote
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works. . . . [T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”
(citations omitted)).
18
A common response to this issue is that the artists should license the
images that they plan to use. This seems obvious from a legal standpoint; however,
several practical problems can arise in a regime that requires artists to license every
image that they use. See Landes, supra note 5, at 20 (“Transaction costs are likely to be
large if the law required the artist to obtain permission to appropriate from multiple
sources. Other things being the same, this implies that the law should be more
sympathetic to the artist whose work borrows from multiple copyrighted sources.”);
Weaver, supra note 5 (referring to appropriation artist Hank Willis Thomas’s
commentary about the difficulties associated with securing permissions and the eightytwo images used in one of his projects, Cat Weaver stated: “One could spend a few years
garnering enough permissions to compile eighty-two relevant images.” (emphasis added)).
19
While some commentators believe that “the objective of copyright could be
better achieved if the visual arts had a distinct and separate fair use regime,” Stephen
E. Weil, Fair Use and the Visual Arts, or Please Leave Some Room for Robin Hood, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 835 (2001), it is plausible that other areas of copyright could benefit
from the standard set forth below as well. In order to translate, the weight of each
factor and the qualities that are deemed important would likely vary from literature to
the visual arts to the dramatic arts, etc.
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use—and particularly transformative use—analysis should
focus not on whether the secondary work comments specifically
on the original, but instead on whether the new work serves a
different artistic purpose than the original. This new
interpretation would distinguish impermissible counterfeiting
from permissible and desirable uses.
Part I begins by outlining the major topics necessary for
the analysis. First, it surveys the history of appropriation art. It
then provides a brief background of copyright law, fair use, and
transformative use. Finally, Part I emphasizes the policy goals
behind the transformative use doctrine and introduces how the
doctrine functions in the context of visual arts litigation.
Part II introduces Cariou v. Prince. It explains the facts
behind the case, illustrates the arguments made by each party,
and details the reasoning the court relied on to reach its decision.
Part III spells out the issues that this note attempts to
address. It predicts the implications that Cariou might have for
the art world and artists and warns of the dangers of a strict
fair use and transformative use standard. It also explains and
critiques two existing attempts at tackling these issues: the
Creative Commons movement and Professor Lawrence Lessig’s
approach, which earmarks certain restrictions and deems all
other copying fair use.
Part IV attempts to solve the problems introduced in
Part III by proposing a new standard for transformative use.
This standard, which is rooted in Judge Leval’s seminal article,
suggests that a secondary work need not comment on the
original and instead must have a different artistic purpose.
This section then explains the factors that would determine
whether a work has a different artistic purpose and is therefore
transformative. This interpretation of Leval’s theory leaves
more room for artists to work freely, yet respects the rights of
copyright owners by essentially granting a thin copyright
protection and preventing pure piracy.
Appropriation often has the effect of making artwork
more accessible to the public. When people recognize an image,
they can engage with the work; viewers are then able to relate
to and understand the work and, ideally, find some meaning
within the work.20 While movements like abstract expressionism
can be incredibly powerful to the learned observer, the layperson
20

See Roxana Badin, Comment, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transformative
Value: Appropriation Art’s Exclusion from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60
BROOK. L. REV 1653, 1656 (1995).
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often has more difficulty connecting with a work of art. Amateur
viewers cannot take the first step of engaging with the piece and
often leave frustrated or confused. Surely the copyright clause
was not written with only art historians in mind. With respect to
the visual arts, the ends of copyright are better served if more
people can extract meaning from the visual arts. If copyright
law becomes so restrictive that the risks of appropriating
outweigh the benefits, however, modern culture will suffer.
I.

APPROPRIATION ART AND FAIR USE

A.

Appropriation in the Visual Arts

Appropriation has long been a device artists use to
comment on their contemporary surroundings. From Picasso to
Duchamp and the Dada to Pop Art and other postmodern
movements, appropriation of images or objects has served to
communicate messages about contemporary society and the
nature of art itself.21 Appropriation art, as a movement, often
refers to a period during the 1980s where artists experimented
with using recognizable images from pop culture in works of
fine art.22 Richard Prince—along with artists such as Jeff
Koons, Barbara Kruger, and Sherrie Levine—is often cited as
an integral voice in the movement.23
Today, artists continue to use appropriation as a
method of reaching wider audiences, developing consistency in
a body of work, or commenting on the work of others.24

21

See
generally
Appropriation,
TATE
GLOSSARY,
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120203094030/http://www.tate.org.uk/coll
ections/glossary/definition.jsp?entryId=23 (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
22
See Johanna Burton, Subject to Revision//2004, in DAVID EVANS,
APPROPRIATION 206 (2009) (“In the 1980’s, appropriation came to be seen as one
particularly effective means to reveal the working mechanisms of various cultural,
social and psychic institutions—and thus considerations of subjectivity and identity
necessarily surfaced in such deconstructive terrain.”).
23
See Thomas Crow, The Return of Hank Herron, in EVANS, supra note 22, at 88;
Roberta Smith, Pilfering From a Culture Out of Joint, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at E33,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/arts/design/28prin.html?pagewanted=all.
24
There are several contemporary movements and artists that use
appropriation in their work. Superflat is a contemporary art movement attributed to
the painter Takashi Murakami. Marc Steinberg, Otaku Consumption, Superflat Art,
and the Return to Edo, 16 JAPAN F. 449, 450 (2004). The style incorporates images of
Japanese comics and characters called manga. Id.
Artist Roger Shimomura uses images of superheroes, cartoons, and racist
imagery in contemporary American culture to point out the way that Asians and Asian
Americans are perceived in America. KARA KELLEY HALLMARK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ASIAN AMERICAN ARTISTS: ARTISTS OF THE AMERICAN MOSAIC 191(2007).
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Moreover, a new culture created by the Internet has had a
massive effect on the arts and is “radically reordering the
concept of appropriation.”25 Indeed, art reporter Randy Kennedy
suggests that contemporary artists use appropriation “as a way
to participate thoughtfully and actively in a culture that is
highly circulated.”26
The practice, however, lies directly in conflict with the
law of copyright. The use of an image to create another work
through appropriation almost necessarily implicates the
derivative work right—and often the reproduction right as
well.27 The conflict is unavoidable. Copyright offers an artist
exclusive rights to reproduce and to create derivative works
from her protected material,28 whereas appropriation art
reproduces the work of another in order to create a new work.
B.

A Brief History of Copyright and Fair Use as Applied to
Appropriation Art

Copyright law is a fundamental body in the American
legal system. Indeed, the right is preserved in the U.S.
Constitution.29 The U.S. Copyright Act recognizes fixed works of
authorship demonstrating sufficient originality.30 It bestows the
exclusive right to, inter alia, reproduce, distribute, and create
derivative works—subject to some exceptions.31 The
Murakami and Shimomura are not the only artists that incorporate
appropriated images in their work. Many street artists use images from popular
culture as references in their artwork. Anny Shaw, Street Artist Mr. Brainwash Sued
over “Copied” Image, ART NEWSPAPER, issue 222, Mar. 9, 2011, available at
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Street-artist-Mr-Brainwash-sued-overcopied-image/23237. In recent years, street art—a movement grown out of graffiti art,
but incorporating methods including stencil, collage, sticker art, and mosaic—has
exploded from the underground to the mainstream art market. Seth Kugel, To the Trained
Eye, Museum Pieces Lurk Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at TR13, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/travel/07iht-09weekend.10790192.html?_r=0.
25
Kennedy, supra note 6.
26
Id.
27
See infra Part I.B. for explanation of the derivative work right and the
reproduction right. Daniel Grant, Will the Legal Status of Appropriation Art Be
Decided This Year?, HUFFINGTON POST ARTS (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:30 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-grant/art-appropriation-laws_b_1179326.html
(quoting Robert J. Kasunic, principal legal adviser at the U.S. Copyright Office)
(“Where derivativeness ends and transformative begins is not all clear.”) Often, the
reproduction right is at issue as well, when an actual copy is fixed to the work.
28
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
29
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]” Id.
30
17 U.S.C. § 106.
31
Id. §§ 107-112.
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reproduction right is fairly straightforward in that it deems as
infringing any unauthorized, fixed copy of the original that is
more than de minimis.32 A derivative work, on the other hand,
is a “work based upon one or more preexisting works.”33 The
derivative work right focuses on whether the copyrighted work
has been “recast, transformed, or adapted” in the new work.34
While the law recognizes these as distinct rights, the derivative
work right and the reproduction right essentially overlap.35
This is especially true in the visual arts where the reference
must be visual and reproducing the original in the new work is
critical.36 When an artist appropriates an image from another
artist, several of the exclusive rights might be implicated. For
example, Richard Prince’s Canal Zone collages would qualify as
derivative works and reproductions.37
Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright
infringement;38 accordingly, an infringing work that is deemed
fair use is lawful.39 There are four factors considered in
determining whether an otherwise infringing act will constitute
fair use. These factors, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, are:
1. the purpose and character of the use; 2. the nature of the
copyrighted work; 3. the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; [and finally] 4.

32

See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION
ECONOMY 302-03 (2010).
33
17 U.S.C. § 101.
34
Id.; see also Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’n Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d
Cir. 1998).
35
See Twin Peaks Prods.v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1373 (2d Cir.
1993) (citing 2 NIMMER § 8.09[A]).
36
Whereas words can capture ideas in many different ways, in a work of
visual art, references to other works are not explained, they are illustrated. Richard
Prince captures this challenge when he discusses and defends his use of “rephotography,” where he photographs other photographs:
By generating what appears to be a double, it might be possible to represent
what the original photograph or picture imagined . . . . More technological
than mechanical, more a simulation than an expression, the result is a
photograph that’s the closest thing to the real thing. And since I feel a bit
more comfortable, perhaps more reassured around a picture that appears to
be truer than it really is, I find the best way for me to make it real is to make
it again, and making it again is enough for me and certainly, personally
speaking, almost me.
LISA PHILLIPS, RICHARD PRINCE 28 (1992).
37
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
38
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
39
17 U.S.C. § 107.
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the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.40

Not all factors must be met in order for a work to qualify as fair
use—instead, courts will engage in a balancing test.41 When
dealing with appropriation art, however, the analysis typically
involves an emphasis on the first factor and more specifically
whether the use is transformative—a question under the first
factor analysis.42
In the first U.S. case to introduce the idea of a fair use
defense, Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Story held that the defendant’s
copy of a George Washington biography was an infringing copy,
stressing that the test was whether the secondary use
“superseded the use of the original work.”43 While this case did not
find fair use or, in the court’s terms, “fair abridgement,” it
acknowledged that there are instances where otherwise
infringing uses might be excused.44 From Folsom, the fair use
doctrine continued to develop. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that this defense “permits [and requires] courts
to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
designed to foster.”45 Fair use thus developed as an effort to
steer the law toward copyright’s ultimate goal—to foster the
progress of art and science—where the exclusive rights
themselves would hinder such progress.
Fair use analysis is intentionally vague.46 Courts engage
in a subjective analysis when considering the fair use defense,
focusing on the facts of each case to determine whether the
exception applies.47 Originally, this approach was necessary to
balance the conflicting interests of copyright protection and
40

Id.
See supra note 10.
42
See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006); Cariou, 784 F.
Supp. 2d at 347.
43
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)
(“[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and
truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the other
hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most important parts of the work, with a
view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work, and substitute the
review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a piracy.”).
44
Id. at 345.
45
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
46
Congress “eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach to fair use.” Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31& 449 (1984).
47
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537,
2539 (2009).
41
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free expression.48 But as the law has developed, and as the
tendency to litigate over copyright infringement has
increased,49 the unpredictable nature of the inquiry has given
way to dangerous results, particularly for genres of art that
rely on the use of appropriated images.
C.

The Evolution of the Transformative Use Doctrine

Traditionally, the first factor of the fair use defense—
“the purpose and character of the use”—has been essential to
fair use analyses dealing with the visual arts.50 And prior to the
introduction of the transformative use prong in 1994, courts
evaluated the first fair use factor only slightly differently than
they do today. In Rogers v. Koons, for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit was not persuaded by artist Jeff
Koons’s defense that his life size, colorful sculpture, String of
Puppies, was a parody of modern society and therefore a fair
use of photographer Art Rogers’s black and white photographic
postcard, Puppies.51 The court determined that Koons copied
Rogers’s photograph “in bad faith, primarily for profit making
motives, and [in a way that] did not constitute a parody of the
original work.”52
The Second Circuit explained that Koons’s use failed
under § 107 because the original was not necessary to the
work; in other words, Koons was not communicating a message
about Rogers’s Puppies, but instead he was making a more
general statement about banality and kitsch.53 The court
“insist[ed] that the audience be aware that underlying the
parody there is an original and separate expression, attributable
to a different artist.”54
48

Fair use is considered one of the ways that copyright law remains in
balance with the First Amendment. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190-91 (2003).
49
Erin Coe, IP Litigation Takes Off in First Half of 2011, LAW360 (July 6,
2011, 5:37 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/256106/ip-litigation-takes-off-in-firsthalf-of-2011.
50
See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250-56 (2d Cir. 2006); Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992).
51
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308-10.
52
Id. at 310.
53
Id.
54
Id. The Second Circuit explained that parody is “when one artist, for comic
effect or social commentary, closely imitates the style of another artist and in doing so
creates a new work that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the original.” Id.
at 309-10. While the court in Rogers did not discuss the doctrine of transformative use,
it nevertheless explained that a parody will likely constitute fair use. Id. Later, in
Campbell, the Supreme Court framed parody as part of the transformative use
question. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The Court also
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Two years later, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the U.S.
Supreme Court introduced “transformative use” into the fair
use analysis.55 Originating with an article written by Judge
Pierre N. Leval, the transformative use doctrine asks whether
the secondary work “adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message . . . .”56 The Court adopted the
Leval standard, stating that “the central purpose of [the first
factor] is to see . . . whether and to what extent the new work is
‘transformative.’”57 The Court, however, also embraced the
concept, central to the Rogers court, which requires the
appropriating artist to comment on the specific original work.58
Although Campbell dealt with the issue of music
sampling, in the years since the Supreme Court’s decision,
visual arts cases have tracked the Supreme Court’s reasoning,
branding Campbell an important landmark in fair use law and
analysis.59 Written by Justice Souter, the Court in Campbell
unanimously held that when determining fair use, “[a]ll [of the
factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in
light of the purposes of copyright.”60 The Court determined that
the hip-hop group 2 Live Crew’s parody of the song “Pretty
Woman” by Roy Orbison and William Dees was “not presumptively
unfair [use]” of the copyrighted original.61 According to Justice
Souter, and the rest of the majority, “the goal of copyright . . . is

distinguished between parody and satire—stating that parody is accorded more fair
use protection than satire. Id. at 580-81. The Second Circuit noted in Blanch, however,
that “the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases involving parody” and
found both that Koons’s painting was satirical and that it was transformative. Blanch,
467 F.3d at 255. Accordingly, parody is an important and oft-emphasized inquiry in
applying the transformative use doctrine, but should not be the end of the discussion.
55
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
56
Id. at 579 (quoting Leval, supra note 15, at 1111).
57
Id. at 579.
58
Id. at 580 (“For the purposes of copyright law, the nub of the definitions,
and the heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some
elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part,
comments on that author’s works. If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical
bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged
infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up
something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes
accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its
commerciality, loom larger.”).
59
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 246; Friedman v. Guetta, No. CV 10-00014, 2011 WL
3510890 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
60
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (citing Leval, supra note 15, at 1110-11).
61
Id. at 594. The Court remanded the case to the lower court, which
eventually found that 2 Live Crew’s song did not constitute fair use. Id.; see also
Kennedy, supra note 25.
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generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”62
Thus, the transformative nature of a work should be given some
degree of deference in a fair use analysis.63
In Campbell, the Court deemed 2 Live Crew’s song
transformative because it parodied the original work thus
commenting directly on the “naiveté” of the original.64 The
Supreme Court explained that, “[parody] can provide social
benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the
process, creating a new one.”65 According to Judge Leval’s
article, however, transformative use covers not just parody, but
“may include . . . symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and
innumerable other uses.”66 Like the standard proposed in this
note, Judge Leval supports protecting a variety of uses rather
than uses that focus only on the actual original. Judge Leval
believes that the first factor is “a question of justification,” and
that:
[If] the secondary use adds value to the original—if the quoted
matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—[it is
transformative because] this is the very type of activity that the fair
use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.67

In the years since Campbell, courts have had difficulty
shaping a test for whether a work is transformative absent
instances where direct parody of the original work can be
reasonably perceived in the secondary work.68
In 2006, Jeff Koons once again found himself before the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. This time, however, Koons
successfully put forth a fair use defense. In Blanch v. Koons,
the court found that Koons’s painting, Niagra, was a fair use of
photographer Andrea Blanch’s photograph published in Allure
magazine.69 The court found that because Blanch had a
different purpose in creating her advertisement than Koons did
62

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
Id. at 579.
64
Id. at 583.
65
Id. at 579.
66
Leval, supra note 15, at 1111.
67
Id.
68
See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (use of fashion
photographer’s image in a collaged painting is transformative); Castle Rock Entm’t, v.
Carol Publ’n Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 141-43 (2d Cir. 1998) (quiz book based on popular
television show is not transformative of the television show); Warner Bros. Entm’t, v.
RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (encyclopedia of fictional
stories is not transformative of the original novels).
69
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244.
63

2013] TRANSFORMATIVE USE & THREATS TO APPROPRIATION 1533

in creating his painting, the use was transformative.70
Moreover, the court found that Koons was commenting on
Blanch’s photograph “by using Blanch’s image as fodder for his
commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass
media.”71 Although the Second Circuit mentioned the importance
of commenting on the original, this explanation seemingly
stretched the standards adopted in Campbell. Essentially, the
court used a standard that looked at the purposes of the works
themselves instead of rigidly requiring that the artist comment
on the original.72
The court emphasized the purposes for which each work
was created, stating that Koons’s purpose in creating his painting
was “sharply different” than Andrea Blanch’s in making her
photograph.73 The court then concluded that the different
“objectives” of each artist “confirm[ed] the transformative nature
of the use.”74 In other words, the court was extremely sensitive to
the “meaning” of Koons’s work and to the social commentary that
he was making through his paintings.75
Nevertheless, while this decision seemed to indicate
sensitivity to the practice of appropriation, the court did not
clearly condone this technique. As a result, artists remained
susceptible to liability. And in Cariou, the federal district court
attempted to narrow any freedom created by the Blanch decision.
II.

CARIOU V. PRINCE

A.

Factual Background

For six years photographer Patrick Cariou lived with
and photographed Rastafarians in their Jamaican landscape.76
In 2000, Cariou published the photographs in a book entitled

70

Id. at 252 (“The sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, and
Blanch had in creating [the original work] confirms the transformative nature of the use.”).
71
Id. at 253.
72
Quoting Campbell’s adoption of Judge Leval’s article, the court in Blanch
stated that “[t]he test for whether [the secondary work’s] use of [the original] is
‘transformative,’ then, is whether it ‘merely supersedes the objects of the original
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression meaning or message.’” Id. (quoting Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). This standard more closely adheres
to the one laid out in Judge Leval’s article.
73
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 252-53.
76
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Yes, Rasta.77 Cariou did not display the photographs and did
not market them other than in the book.78
From the end of 2007 to February 2008, Richard Prince,
a world-renowned appropriation artist,79 exhibited several of his
new works at the Eden Rock Hotel in St. Barths.80 In one of the
paintings, Canal Zone, Prince used thirty-five photographs
from the Yes, Rasta book and applied them to a wooden board
using “primitive collage technique.”81 This piece was to be the
title work in Prince’s forthcoming collection and planned
screenplay of the same name.82 Toward the end of 2008, Canal
Zone opened at the Gagosian Gallery in the Chelsea
neighborhood of New York City.83
Canal Zone, the show, consisted of twenty-nine
paintings, each featuring images collaged, sometimes tinted or
cropped, often with Prince’s own drawing or brushstrokes
overlaid.84 Most of the paintings were several feet tall.85 Richard
Prince used at least forty-one photographs from Patrick

77

Id.
Id. at 344.
79
Richard Prince “is a leading member of the sprawling appropriation
generation . . . that continues to add new recruits. . . .” Smith, supra note 23. “He
started his career as a figure painter,” but was making collages by 1975. PHILLIPS,
supra note 36, at 21. Prince’s rise to fame and recognition in the art world, however,
came with his “rephotography” of magazine ads. The ultimate form of appropriation,
Prince would photograph photographs. The result was puzzling: “To the viewer,
Prince’s alterations may have seemed minimal, even nonexistent, but there was in fact
dramatic transformation.” Id. at 27. Accordingly, the techniques he used in the Canal
Zone series were hardly new to the artist’s process and arguably far less egregious to
copyright owners than some of his past work. In the 1980s and 1990s, Prince created a
body of work entitled Untitled (Cowboy), which consisted of photographs of
advertisements as the entirety of the work. The Metropolitan Museum of Art described
one of the pieces as “a copy (the photograph) of a copy (the advertisement) of a myth
(the cowboy).” Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, Richard Prince: Untitled (Cowboy),
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/
2000.272 (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). The collection became one of Prince’s most
acclaimed exercises in social commentary and expression; it was a symbol of the power
of appropriation.
80
Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 343; see also Deidre Woollard, Artist Richard
Prince Exhibits in St. Barths at the Eden Rock Hotel, LUXIST (Nov. 17, 2007, 11:03 AM),
http://www.luxist.com/2007/11/17/artist-richard-prince-exhibits-in-st-barths-at-theeden-rock-ho/.
81
Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 343; Richard Prince “Canal Zone,”
ARTNEWS.ORG, (Nov. 20, 2008), http://artnews.org/gallery.php?i=1263&exi=13838.
82
Prince, supra note 81.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
See AO On Site: Richard Prince’s Canal Zone, Gagosian Gallery, Saturday,
November 8th, Chelsea, New York, ART OBSERVED (Nov. 13, 2008), http://artobserved.com/
2008/11/ao-on-site-richard-princes-canal-zone-gagosian-gallery-saturday-november-8thchelsea-new-york/.
78

2013] TRANSFORMATIVE USE & THREATS TO APPROPRIATION 1535

Cariou’s photography book Yes, Rasta.86 Some of Prince’s
paintings “consist[ed] almost entirely of images taken from Yes,
Rasta, . . . collaged, enlarged, cropped, tinted and/or overpainted, while other[] [paintings] . . . use[d] [only] portions of
Yes, Rasta as collage elements.”87 Additionally, Prince
appropriated several images from other sources.88 Richard
Prince was developing a storyline in this collection.89 Prince was
channeling rock music, contemporary apocalyptic theories,
heroes of the art world, such as DeKooning and Cezanne, and
notions of his own life.90 The District Court for the Southern
District of New York noted that some of the paintings in Canal
Zone91 contained “substantial original painting,” while others
relied on different artistic devices to alter the Yes, Rasta
photographs and other collage elements in the scenes.92
Though Cariou had only licensed the photographs in
Yes, Rasta for that book—with the exception of a small few that
he sold to friends—he testified that around the time Canal
Zone showed in Chelsea, he had been negotiating with
Christiane Celle, the owner of a small SoHo gallery in New
York City to put on an exhibition of the collection.93 According
to the record, negotiations came to a halt when Celle
encountered the Canal Zone show.94 Alleging that she did not
want to “capitalize” on Prince’s success or to show work that
had “been ‘done already,’” Celle cancelled all plans.95 Cariou’s
hopes of becoming a gallery artist almost a decade after he shot
the Yes, Rasta series were dashed.96

86

Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 343-44.
90
Id. at 344.
91
Hereinafter Canal Zone refers to the entire body of work at issue in
Cariou, unless otherwise indicated.
92
Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
93
Id. Although the court did not question the arrangement between Celle
and Cariou, attorneys for Prince challenged its credibility. See Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 20-22, Cariou, 784 F. Supp.
2d 337 (No. 08 Civ. 11327), 2009 WL 3054517. The gallery was Clic Bookstore and
Gallery owned by Celle. See id.; CLIC GALLERY, http://clicgallery.com/about/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
94
Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
95
Id.
96
While Celle was indeed interested in representing Cariou, the deal never
really materialized. In her testimony regarding the desire to represent the French
photographer, Celle stated, “[w]e agree[d] on it but we never really pursue[d] it.”
Memorandum of Law, supra note 93, at 21. Moreover, the Court of Appeals decision
revealed that Celle was initially interested in an entirely different body of work by
87
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In December 2008, Cariou filed a lawsuit against
Richard Prince, Gagosian Gallery, Inc., and Lawrence
Gagosian alleging, inter alia, copyright infringement.97 The
defendants claimed fair use as an affirmative defense.98
B.

The Court’s Reasoning

On March 18, 2011, Judge Deborah Batts issued her
opinion granting summary judgment for plaintiff Patrick
Cariou.99
While the court noted that, in determining fair use, “all
of the four factors are to be explored,” much of the opinion
concentrated on the first factor: “the purpose and character of
the use.”100 The court articulated the first factor as a threepronged inquiry: first, evaluating the transformative nature of
the secondary work, then the commerciality, and finally
whether the defendant acted in bad faith.101
In determining whether Canal Zone employed a
transformative use of the Yes, Rasta photos, Judge Batts
emphasized the extent to which Canal Zone commented
specifically on Cariou’s photographs, as well as Prince’s facial
alterations to the photographs and his intent in making the art.102
Whereas the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Blanch
focused on the difference in the respective purposes of the artists,
the Cariou court concentrated on whether the secondary work
commented on the original.103 The district court opened the
discussion by stating that “all of the precedent [the court could]
identify imposes a requirement that the new work in some way
comment on, relate to the historical context of, or critically refer
back to the original works.”104 Judge Batts found that since

Patrick Cariou—one that dealt with surfers and surfing culture. See Cariou v. Prince,
714 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir. 2013).
97
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, at 2-3, Cariou, 784 F.
Supp. 2d 337 (No. 08 Civ. 11327), 2009 WL 956547.
98
Answer of Defendant, at ¶ 33, Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (No. 08 Civ.
11327), 2009 WL 1632977.
99
Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 355.
100
Id. at 347-48 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101
See id. at 347-52.
102
See id. at 348-50.
103
Id. at 349 (“Prince’s [p]aintings are transformative only to the extent that
they comment on the [p]hotos.”).
104
See id. at 348. Of course, this ignores Blanch, in which Jeff Koons’ painting
appropriated Andrea Blanch’s photograph “as fodder for his commentary on the social
and aesthetic consequences of mass media,” rather than to make a comment about
Blanch’s work. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F. 3d 244, 252 (2d. Cir. 2006).
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Prince was not referring directly or commenting specifically on
Cariou’s work, it was not analogous to other transformative use
cases.105 She relied on Rogers for the notion that a “different
artistic use”106 is not a justifiable basis for the transformative
nature of a work and held that the paintings were
“transformative only to the extent that they comment[ed] on
[Cariou’s photographs].”107
Richard Prince’s own testimony was integral in this line
of analysis. Noting that “Prince testified that he has no interest
in the original meaning of the photographs he used,” the court
found that Prince therefore had no message to convey and that
he “did not intend to comment on Cariou.” Instead, the court
found that he endeavored to make “creative and new” work,
which was “not transformative within the meaning of Section
107.”108 Moreover, the court remarked on Prince’s testimony
that his intent in using pictures, like the ones he took from Yes,
Rasta, was to import truth and fact into his work, and the court
took this to mean that Prince’s purpose in using Cariou’s
pictures was “the same as Cariou’s original purpose in taking
them: a desire to communicate to the viewer core truths about
Rastafarians and their culture.”109
The court further examined the actual facial
transformations of the photographs. Judge Batts concluded
that the transformative elements varied, and that “in the
works most heavily drawn from Cariou’s [p]hotos . . . there is
vanishingly little, if any, transformative element[.]”110
Conversely, the court noted that “in those [works] where
Cariou’s [p]hotos play a comparatively minor role, [Prince] has
a stronger argument that his work is transformative of
Cariou’s original [p]hotos.”111 The opinion, however, went on to
grant summary judgment with respect to all of the works in the

105

Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
Id. (quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992)).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 349.
109
Id. The court also used Prince’s testimony to find that he acted in bad
faith. Since he explained that he did not implement a different standard in his use of
copyrighted work as opposed to images in the public domain, and instead based the
decision on “whether he likes the image,” Judge Batts found that Prince acted
improperly. Id. at 9. Moreover, she found that because Prince did not attempt to
contact Cariou in an effort to procure a license, this further supported a finding of bad
faith. Id. However, if Prince thought at all about whether his use was lawful, he likely
would have seen his work as fair use, and thus free from a licensing requirement.
110
Id. at 350.
111
Id.
106
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Canal Zone series that used Cariou’s photographs, ordering
that they be destroyed.112
III.

NARROW INTERPRETATION OF FAIR USE WILL CHILL
ARTIST SPEECH

A.

Analysis and Implications of Cariou v. Prince

Although this decision “set off alarm bells” in the art
world, the legal reasoning is not unprecedented or
extraordinarily unique.113 On one hand, Blanch seems to
provide more freedom for these types of artists, while on the
other, the precedent set by Rogers, and even Campbell, limits
transformative use to parodies that comment on the specific
original work.114 The Cariou decision relies on the second line of
reasoning.115 Because courts have not yet set a definitive standard
by which to judge whether a work of art is transformative, the
analysis is much more subjective than necessary.
Plainly, it was not Prince’s intent to portray “core truths
about Rastafarians and their culture.”116 Prince incorporated
Cariou’s images of Rastafarians in collages, both next to and
beneath images of naked women, guitars, as well as his own
lines, shapes, and brushstrokes. First, the title Canal Zone
indicates that he must have had some personal connection to
the work because Prince was born in the Panama Canal Zone.117
Furthermore, the hints that Prince did give about the meaning
of the work all dealt with apocalyptic landscapes; Prince even
had a storyline to go along with the collection.118 There were
112

Id. at 355-56. The court also found that Prince’s gallery, Gagosian Gallery,
as well as its owner, Lawrence Gagosian, was liable for vicarious and contributory
infringement. Id. at 354. This finding prompted several prominent museums to file
amicus briefs urging that the decision could “deter museums from acquiring and
displaying important works.” Abigail Rubenstein, Museums, Google Back Richard
Prince Fair Use Appeal, LAW360 (Nov. 3, 2011, 7:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/
newyork/articles/283044.
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit analyzed the works individually,
ultimately determining that twenty five of the thirty do constitute fair use. See Cariou
v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2013).
113
Kennedy, supra note 25.
114
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-80 (1994);
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992).
115
Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
116
Id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 25 (“[T]he primary intention was to
create a work of art . . . and that is the kind of creativity the law seeks to encourage.”).
117
See supra text accompanying note 103; see also Biography, RICHARD
PRINCE, http://www.richardprince.com/bio/.
118
See supra text accompanying notes 103-105.
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reasons that he chose Cariou’s pictures rather than any of the
myriad images that might return on an online image search.119
No critics or viewers interpreted Prince’s collages as imparting
truthful accounts of Rastafarian culture, and instead they
remarked on the title—which served to place the characters in
Panama—as well as the collage techniques that Prince used in
their creation.120 Most of Prince’s career has been spent
appropriating images where his message is not about the
image itself, but something bigger, deeper, and more
powerful.121 In response to questions about his reasons for using
appropriation in his work, Prince said that he “wanted to
contribute to something that already existed in the world.”122
For an artist that has been using the images of others for
decades, to now have to guess whether his future work will
land him at a defendant’s table will surely affect his freedom to
work going forward.
B.

The Dangers of Strict Fair Use and Transformative Use
Standards

The importance of the visual arts cannot be
understated. Notably, the advancement of the arts is more
important than the protection of intellectual property because,
as Judge Leval points out, it is the end to which copyright law
is the means.123 But starting with its introduction in Campbell,
and now, after Cariou, the transformative use defense has
become a legal gray area, leaving artists unable to predict
whether their use is lawful. This state of purgatory will surely
stunt the future development of the arts. This is especially true
as appropriation becomes more suited to audiences. The threat
of litigation is ever increasing and has the consequence of
119

See Grant, supra note 27 (“[Cariou’s attorney] noted that Prince could have
avoided the problem altogether by traveling to Jamaica and taking his own
photographs that he scanned onto his canvases, but the entire point of Prince’s art is
commentary on images that already exist in the world.”). Presumably, there was also a
reason Prince used Cariou’s photographs and not other images of Rastafarians, though
he would have been vulnerable to this kind of claim regardless of whose image he used.
120
See Eugene Kan, Richard Prince “Canal Zone” Exhibition Recap,
HYPEBEAST (Nov. 12, 2008), http://hypebeast.com/2008/11/richard-prince-canal-zoneexhibition-recap/; Martha Schwendener, Female Trouble: Richard Prince and Cindy
Sherman, VILLAGE VOICE (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.villagevoice.com/2008-1210/art/female-trouble-richard-prince-and-cindy-sherman/.
121
See generally Smith, supra note 23.
122
Transcript of Videotaped Deposition of Richard Prince at 43, Cariou v.
Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08 Civ. 11327 (DAB)).
123
Leval, supra note 15, at 1118-19.
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discouraging artists. Moreover, licensing can be too
burdensome to undertake. Fair use could support an
environment of creativity and sharing within the art world if
courts realize the importance of a visual language to artists
and relax the requirement that artist’s testimony and intent fit
squarely into a legal standard.
Many have suggested, quite correctly, that copyright
law as it has developed, and continues to develop, is ill-suited
to the schools of art that employ appropriation in their work.124
If the Southern District’s decision is upheld, the effect will not
only chill Richard Prince’s forthcoming work, but also that of
all artists that “build upon previous works in ways that add
value and create new meanings, but do not necessarily comment
on the earlier work.”125 Furthermore, appropriation is becoming
an increasingly useful visual tool. With the proliferation of the
Internet and digital technologies, the current generation has
only become more visual and commercial.126 The law should not
push back on the natural evolution of culture, but should
embrace these popular forms of expression and conform to the
practices that are relevant in the modern day.127 If the visual
arts are to remain relevant and meaningful, then artists who
choose to comment on society and contemporary issues will
continue to find it necessary to refer to images, popular culture,
and their own surroundings. While classical styles and
expressive veins in art will surely remain, new movements
often incorporate references to pop culture, photography, or
any countless number of works that do not originate with the
secondary user.128
While artists rarely consider the legal implications of
their work during the creative process, the ramifications can be
devastating. Indeed, one of the most influential collage artists,
Robert Rauschenberg, “grew so sick of copyright squabbles that
124

See generally Weil, supra note 19; Badin, supra note 20; Rachel Isabelle
Butt, Note, Appropriation Art and Fair Use, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1055 (2010).
125
Feder & Muttreja, supra note 16.
126
See Louise Story, Anywhere the Eye Can See, It’s Now Likely to See an Ad.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/15/
business/media/15everywhere.html?pagewanted=all, for discussion.
127
Some argue that the speed with which the network of image sharing is
growing cannot be slowed regardless of what courts deem lawful. See Kennedy, supra
note 25 (“[T]oday’s flow of creative expression, riding a tide of billions of instantly
accessible digital images and clips, is rapidly becoming so free and recycling so
reflexive that it is hard to imagine it being slowed, much less stanched, whatever
happens in court.”).
128
See supra note 68.
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he eventually abandoned the practice of exploiting the
photography of others . . . .”129 Artists that become aware of the
massive damages that Prince and his gallery face will have no
choice but to pursue other techniques, because it is a rare artist
that can afford such a financial blow and survive. Cariou and
his legal counsel argue that art can only benefit from a stricter
fair use standard, even if artists must defend the work in
court.130 They are misguided. Art history undoubtedly benefits
from having Robert Rauschenbergs and Richard Princes. While
the Cariou decision protects the exclusive rights set forth in the
Copyright Act, it loses sight of the Constitutional goal of
promotion of creativity and the arts. In other words, the
exclusive rights are protected at the expense of copyright law’s
ultimate goal; the forest is lost for the trees.
Over the past few years, copyright litigation has become
increasingly frequent.131 One article posted on Clancco, an art
law blog created by Associate Director of Volunteer Lawyers for
the Arts Sergio Munoz Sarmiento, argues that a reason for the
increased litigation is an effort to develop more pro-plaintiff
law.132 Artists such as Chapman Kelly, Shepard Fairey, Thierry
Guetta, and of course, Richard Prince have all been involved in
copyright litigation that threatens certain of their works.133 And
more and more lesser known artists are also becoming involved
in copyright litigation.134 The substantial damages available
provide an incentive to diligently monitor one’s work. In turn,
this creates a dangerous environment in which to create.
A major problem is that judges will order that work be
destroyed, like the court in Cariou ordered. To prevent viewers
from experiencing an entire body of work by an important
contemporary artist seems inconsistent with the goals of
copyright. “When the copyright law is used—as it was in
129

SUSAN M. BIELSTEIN, PERMISSIONS: A SURVIVAL GUIDE: BLUNT TALK
ABOUT ART AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 87 (2006). On the other hand, if—as I am
proposing—fair use offers broader protection for artists, it is “not likely” that the
authors of the originals would similarly stop creating work simply because another
may legally use the work in a new piece. See Weaver, supra note 5.
130
See Sarmiento, supra note 6; Weaver, supra note 5.
131
See Sarmiento, supra note 6 (“More and more, artists, other individuals,
and corporations are suing artists . . . .”); see also Coe, supra note 49.
132
Sarmiento, supra note 6.
133
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S.
Ct. 380 (2011); Friedman v. Guetta, No. CV 10-00014, 2011 WL 3510890 (C.D. Cal. May 27,
2011); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Kennedy, supra note 7.
134
Sarmiento, supra note 6. Several articles explain the history of
appropriation as a tool in the visual arts. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 5; Weil, supra
note 19; Butt, supra note 124.

1542

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

[Rogers]—not merely to award damages but actually to
suppress a work of art, then its effect is to diminish the stock of
reality available to all of those who might one day have come
into contact with that work.”135
Advocates for copyright plaintiffs argue that there is no
problem with requiring artists to license the images that they
choose to incorporate in their work just as music samplers
must license the songs that they use in their mixes.136 But this
is not as simple as these licensing proponents make it out to be.
Licensing in the visual art world is impractical, sometimes
impossible, and serves only the copyright holders and not the
objectives of copyright laid out in the Constitution. If the artist
cannot obtain a license, then the work will suffer. Where it is
difficult or impossible to obtain a license, the goals of copyright are
arguably deterred because by prohibiting the use of certain images,
the artist’s choices are narrowed, stifling artistic progress.137
It is important that artists be able to use images from
other sources than their own creation. The reason for this is
colloquially explained in the phrase “a picture is worth a thousand
words.” Indeed, “images cannot be adequately defined at all, either
by words or by other images.”138 The image itself is necessary. If
Prince had painted slightly similar images of Rastafarians, the
message would be muddied, if not lost altogether.

135

Weil, supra note 19, at 838.
See LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 7:54; see
also Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993); Grand Upright Music,
Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records., Inc. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
137
The issue of obtaining a license often informs another prong of the first
factor: bad faith. However, the relationship between attempts to license and bad faith
is often murky, and whereas Judge Batts used Prince’s failure to seek permission as
support for a finding of bad faith, “Blanch squarely held that, in assessing fair use, the
failure to seek permission cannot be deemed bad faith.” Feder & Muttreja, supra note
16. Additionally, because of the heavily image based society that has come about since the
rise of the internet, the “ideological baggage” that used to be associated with appropriation
has all but vanished. Kennedy, supra note 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Judge Leval strongly opposes any consideration of bad faith in determining
fair use. Leval, supra note 15, at 1126. Bad faith should not be a consideration in the
fair use defense. This factor is irrelevant to the purposes of both copyright and the fair
use doctrine and serves only to muddy the waters. Judge Leval expressed his
disagreement with the use of a bad faith factor in his article, saying that “[t]his
practice . . . is misguided.” Id. (“[Questioning the morality of the use] produces
anomalies that conflict with the goals of copyright and adds to the confusion
surrounding the doctrine.”) In correctly pointing out that such a question is “tempting”
to judges, Leval argues that there is no legal reason for such a “morality test.” Id.
These questions often pollute fair use questions, especially when dealing with cryptic
and sometimes arrogant artists who have limited legal tact.
138
Weil, supra note 19, at 839.
136
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An artist’s work is not devoid of a legally condoned use
(that is, that the work is a commentary on an appropriated
work) merely because the artist does not correctly assert a legal
ground for the use (that is, that they intended to comment on
the work). The very idea behind appropriation art is that it
“create[s] a new situation, and therefore, a new meaning or set
of meanings, for a familiar image.”139 The creator often sees the
work very differently from others and rarely has a true sense of
the legal consequences of his own words. Artists are frequently
called upon to talk about their work. To an individual who is
unfamiliar with the case law, even with guidance by counsel,
that person’s own vanities, sensitivities, and tendencies are
likely to obstruct their answers in a deposition or on the stand.
Judge Batts emphasized that “[Prince’s] intent was not
transformative within the meaning of Section 107.”140 But this
is not the test that Judge Leval proposed when he coined the
transformative use idea. And it is not the test that judges
should apply today. To rely so heavily on the testimony of the
artist leaves society’s exposure to valuable cultural reference in
the hands of art makers, who are not versed in the law, have
very different perspectives than judges and lawyers, and may
not realize the impact that their words can have.141
Moreover, heavy reliance on the need to comment on the
original closes a tremendous door for artists. The Supreme
Court in Campbell noted that 2 Live Crew’s comment on the
Roy Orbison original was important to the analysis, but to make
this a requirement for fair use in the visual arts is too narrow of
an analysis and bars key uses that should be deemed legal.142
C.

Current Solutions

There have been many suggestions on how to loosen the
constraints on fair use and transformative use. Some attempts
at expanding the public domain are the Creative Commons
Project, and a similar project attempted by the BBC.143
139

See Appropriation, TATE GLOSSARY, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20120203094030/http://www.tate.org.uk/collections/glossary/definition.jsp?entryId=23 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2013).
140
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (emphasis added).
141
On appeal, the two opinions disagreed as to whether the court should have
considered Richard Prince’s testimony. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 713 (2d Cir.
2013) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
142
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
143
About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited
Jan. 17, 2012). The BBC “Creative Archive” project ended in 2006, shortly after its
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Essentially, these programs allow creators to designate their
material as usable by others, with options of how their work may
be used and which uses are protected.144 These programs take a
welcome step in the right direction; however they ultimately
rely on individual creators’ altruism or personal beliefs, and
the artists’ willingness to actively pursue these licenses.145
Moreover, the scheme is one that approaches this problem by
limiting copyright protections as opposed to expanding fair use
exceptions.146 While an expansion of fair uses necessarily
implies a limitation on copyright, it makes sense for the change
to come from the fair use front because that is the camp more
closely devoted to free expression.147
Courts should err on the side of dissemination of the
arts. Lawrence Lessig proposes an alternative approach to fair
use, arguing that the United States articulate a strict set of
protected uses and deem all other uses presumptively fair.148
This approach is essentially the opposite of many international
copyright schemes.149 Such a dramatic overhaul of the fair use
jurisprudence would likely take years and would be incredibly
complicated, contested, and subject to fierce lobbying. But in
the context of appropriation, a less drastic measure could
provide the freedom necessary to keep artists creating while
protecting copyright’s necessary and beneficial facets.

advent. BBC Creative Archive Pilot, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/creativearchive/ (last
visited Jan. 19, 2012).
144
See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
145
In order to secure a Creative Commons or similar license, one needs to
affirmatively designate that the work is under a Creative Commons license. See
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
146
Several suggestions for a more liberal copyright scheme take this
approach. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 738-58 (2012).
147
See supra note 35.
148
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 295 (2004) (“[T]he law should mark
the uses that are protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
protected.”).
149
Most other countries have a much more strictly codified fair use doctrine
where the types of non-infringing uses are listed and “rarely, if ever, [will their courts]
depart from the statutes to find limitations of their own for other types of conduct not
envisioned ex-ante by the legislature.” JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL
INFORMATION ECONOMY 531 (2010). This highlights a positive aspect of the U.S. fair
use doctrine—that we do have more leeway. Unfortunately, courts are often reluctant
to take advantage of this freedom when faced with visual art incorporating
appropriated works.
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IV.

COURTS SHOULD USE A SEPARATE FAIR USE ANALYSIS
FOR THE VISUAL ARTS

A.

Fair Use Should Focus on the Distinct Artistic Purpose

Fair use is purposefully ambiguous.150 However, a lack of
a bright line rule should not turn the courts into arbiters of
social value. While an ambiguous transformative use standard
may provide more opportunities for attorneys who can pose
strong arguments on either side, it can be troubling and
limiting for artists that must balance creativity with legality.151
The deeper question of transformative use should therefore be
clarified to help guide courts when dealing with these kinds of
cases. Works should be deemed transformative whenever the
secondary use serves a different artistic purpose.
Both Richard Prince’s Canal Zone and Jeff Koons’s
String of Puppies used the original work for a different purpose
than the original artist: to comment on societies. Prince was
creating a fictional world, whereas Cariou was portraying a
reality. Similarly, Koons was highlighting kitsch and cliché,
whereas Rogers was capturing an adorable image to print on
greeting cards. The respective messages—while both valid—
were entirely distinct.152 “Visual artists, above all, need a fair
use rule that is both flexible and spacious enough to permit
them a considerable degree of appropriation.”153
According to Judge Leval, “[T]he [secondary] use must
be productive and must employ the [original work] in a
different manner or for a different purpose from the original”154;
it must “add[] value to the original.”155 The transformative use
question is central to issues involving appropriation art and

150

“Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine
over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since
the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is
possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.” H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
151
See Grant, supra note 27.
152
Patrick Cariou’s photographs in Yes, Rasta are documentary style
“portraits.” Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Richard Prince,
on the other hand, used Cariou’s photos as “ingredients” in the “recipe” that became
Canal Zone. Videotaped Deposition, supra note 122, at 30. Prince was creating a set of
collaged paintings that paid tribute to his predecessors such as Willem DeKooning. Id. at 156.
153
As Weil points out, this would also apply to “slides, transparencies, and
printed illustrations,” so that the art world could function efficiently from artist to
collector to museum to gallery. Weil, supra note 19, at 839.
154
Leval, supra note 15, at 1111.
155
Id.
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therefore adjustments to the transformative use law will likely
have an actual effect on the outcomes of these cases. Courts
must unequivocally abandon the notion that in order for a
secondary work of visual art to be deemed transformative it
must comment on the original. This limitation severely limits
artistic freedom. Art that uses appropriated images does so for a
variety of reasons, far beyond a desire to critique or parody a
specific work.156 Art law scholar Stephen E. Weil points out that
“[a]rtists have always perceived the environment around them as
both inspiration to act and as raw material to mold and remold.”157
Artists must have the freedom to play with images,
particularly in an age where images dominate daily life and the
internet makes access to images and visual culture effortless.158
In the past, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
been receptive to this idea,159 but no court has yet to confidently
establish a precedent that allows artists the legal safety to
work in this way. Instead, a preference for parody has
dominated ever since the Supreme Court decided Campbell
and, while parody is certainly an effective tool, and one that
should be protected, “[p]arody is by no means the only mode by
which one work of art may refer to another in order to achieve
a desired artistic effect.”160 Indeed, statements that extend to
society at large and comment on contemporary culture are
arguably more important to art history and expression than
those that are specific to a certain work. Jeff Koons’s message
about banality and kitsch is arguably more profound than 2
Live Crew’s statement about Roy Orbison’s pop song. Both
statements should be protected, and in both cases, the original

156

See Julie C. Van Camp, Originality in Postmodern Appropriation Art, 36 J.
ARTS, MGMT., L., & SOC’Y 247, 247 (2007).
157
Weil, supra note 19, at 836.
158
See supra Part III.B.
159
See Feder & Muttreja, supra note 16 (quoting Bill Graham Archives v. Doris
Kindersley, 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2006)) (“[T]he Second Circuit rejected a ‘limited
interpretation of transformative use’ under which ‘each reproduced image should have
been accompanied by comment or criticism related to the artistic nature of the image.’”).
160
Weil, supra note 19, at 838. Parody is a desirable fair use because, often,
authors and creators are not inclined to license their work if they feel they are going to
be made light of or have their reputation belittled. See Landes, supra note 5, at 21
(“When the parody targets the plaintiff’s work, the parties are unlikely to come to
terms on a price that allows the defendant to make fun, embarrass, or even humiliate
the plaintiff’s work.”). The problem is that fear of parody is not the only reason an
artist might keep their work from being used by others.
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artist is likely to dislike the message that his work is being
used to convey.161
B.

Factors to be Weighed Under the Artistic Purpose
Standard

Copyright law needs a new transformative use standard
that gives artists more freedom to engage in uses that should
be allowed, while outlawing those that are purely piracy. There
are several factors, a balancing of which could determine
whether the work serves a different artistic purpose and thus
is transformative of the original. These factors include: (i) the
objective difference between the two works, (ii) expert
testimony from art historians and critics, and (iii) the artist’s
intent. This approach would widen the fair use defense, but
would bring the law closer to achieving the policy goals laid out
in the Constitution.
First, the objective difference between the original and
the new work will serve as an important prong under this
standard. This factor has traditionally been important to the
first factor of the fair use analysis.162 If the important legal
difference between a transformative work and the original is
that it serves a new artistic purpose, then the visual difference
that a viewer experiences plays a part in that analysis. The
objective difference can distinguish secondary works that use
the original for inspiration from those that use the original in a
more substantial way, which would deserve more explanation.163
If the visible differences between the original and the secondary
use are great, that difference will weigh heavily toward a
finding of fair use.
The second element in this new standard—expert
testimony from art historians and critics—will work towards
161

If a reason to offer fair use protection is a reluctance to license for fear of
reputational damage, an artist like Art Rogers might understandably be offended that
his work is being used to comment on the banal.
162
Although courts have not typically analyzed the objective differences in
their own category, most transformative use visual arts cases begin with a detailed
description of the two works, indicating that the medium and overall aesthetic of the
work is important to the court. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247-48 (2d Cir.
2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1992); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F.
Supp. 2d 337, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
163
An example of an artist using the original as “inspiration” would be Jeff
Koons’s use in Blanch where that particular style of advertising informed the
secondary work. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247. Under this standard, frivolous claims will
be dismissed, but this initial inquiry will heavily tip the scale in favor of fair use where
just enough use remains to survive a motion to dismiss.
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revealing the outside purpose of the work: that which “may
reasonably be perceived.”164 An article in Hyperallergic, a forum
for art related issues and topic discussions, addresses some of
these issues and advocates for introducing expert testimony so
that judges are not acting as art historians.165 Experts in the art
world such as critics, curators, and historians can provide
substantial information about the artistic value and purpose of
a work of art. This will particularly help with cases dealing
with major art players.166 Experts can testify on both the artistic
functions of each work—meaning both the original and the
secondary—as well as each artist’s reputation and body of
work. Such information can often—though not always—say a
great deal about an artist, give insight into whether an
appropriated work falls within a market that the original artist
would be likely to exploit and, in some cases, add context to the
work of the secondary artist.167
The artist’s intent—a factor that currently plays a
substantial role in fair use analysis—should still serve as an
important element in evaluating the purpose and character of
the use and whether the use is transformative.168 This is despite
164

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994).
Weaver, supra note 5.
166
Because many of the cases that reach this stage deal with highly successful
artists, this testimony will be relatively valuable. Such high profile cases set the bar for
lesser-known artists in the field.
167
This analysis is related to the fourth factor of fair use, “the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 17 U.S.C. § 107(4)
(2006), in that often, works with different purposes will pose less of a risk to each
other’s markets. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (“[W]hen . . . the second use is
transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not
be so readily inferred.”). By analyzing the purpose as determinative of transformative
nature, the subjectivity of the fourth factor as it relates to the visual arts is removed.
Weil argues that “little or no weight” should be given to the fourth factor of § 107, and
instead more weight to the first factor. Weil, supra note 19, at 840-41. This seems to
square somewhat with Judge Leval’s argument.
165

The ultimate objective in forming this new standard would be to reduce
copyright litigation. Just as it might be sound copyright policy to provide
contemporary visual artists with greater latitude than other creative
practitioners as to what they may incorporate into their own work, it may
also be sound policy to limit the ability of such artists to use copyright to
impede the free circulation of images of that work within the cultural and
commercial marketplaces.
Id. at 840. The solution has several elements, however, all of which are necessary and
overdue. This would, in effect, often make the fourth factor irrelevant because it is
most unlikely that a work that expresses a different message and has a different
purpose than the original will supplant the market for the original. Certainly there will
nevertheless be anomalies, as in the case of Christiane Celle’s testimony in Cariou.
168
Historically, the way an artist testifies about the work at issue has had a
substantial impact on the outcome of the case. Some argue that one of the central
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the complications that this inquiry sometimes causes. While
artist testimony can often be misleading, the importance of the
appropriator’s vision often reflects the function of the work in
the public. In some ways, an ingredient of morality might
return in this element; however it would appear in a very
different way than that which courts use today.169 If the artist
used the original with the “good faith” intent of creating work
with a new artistic purpose then, perhaps, that would be
important to the question of remedies.170
This new standard recognizes the importance of
appropriation in art and is sensitive to and respects artist’s
creative prerogative. The standard is more clearly defined and
is forgiving to the visual arts, while maintaining the traditional
flexibility of U.S. copyright law. Establishing this standard
reasons for the Second Circuit’s seemingly divergent opinions in Rogers and Blanch
was the difference in the testimony and attitude of Jeff Koons. See Grant, supra note
27 (“Jessica Litman, a professor at the University of Michigan Law School, claimed
that part of the reason that Koons lost [Rogers] but won [Blanch] was that ‘the first
time he came into court with a lot of art world attitude about “I’m the artist, I can do
whatever I want,” and the second time he made a more reasonable statement about the
kind of message that appropriation art sends. That goes a long way.’”).
Indeed, “[l]awyers and artists sometimes just don’t speak the same
language.” Eric Randall, Lawyers and Artists Don’t Always Speak the Same Language,
ATL. WIRE, Dec. 28, 2011, available at http://www.theatlanticwire.com/entertainment/
2011/12/lawyers-and-artists-dont-always-speak-same-language/46740/. Courts like to
hear testimony that connects directly to the legal test to be applied and often, artists
pontificate in broad, abstract terms with several meanings, few of which speak to the
elements of the legal standard.
169
For example, in Cariou, the court emphasized Prince’s “bad faith” for
failing to seek permission to use the photos. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
170
Remedies play an extremely important role in copyright litigation. This is
because of the massive damages that can be awarded—particularly when statutory
damages are available—as well as the crushing equitable remedies and, finally, the
availability of attorney’s fees.
Statutory damages, which are available under the circumstances listed in
17 U.S.C. § 412, can range from $750 to $30,000 per infringement, and can be raised to
$150,000 per infringement upon a showing of “willful[ness].” 17 U.S.C. § 504. For a
critical analysis of statutory damages in copyright law, see Pamela Samuelson & Tara
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009).
The Cariou case ordered significant remedies for the plaintiff. It has been
described as a “very harsh decision.” Weaver, supra note 5. Judge Batts ordered that
the defendants be “enjoined and restrained permanently” from continuing to exploit
any of the work that used Cariou’s images, and that they “deliver up for impounding,
destruction, or other disposition, . . . all infringing copies of [Cariou’s] [p]hotographs,”
as well as “notify in writing any current or future owners of [Prince’s infringing]
[p]aintings . . . that the [p]aintings were not lawfully made . . . and . . . cannot lawfully
be displayed . . . .” Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 355-56.
Finally, attorney’s fees provide an incentive for plaintiff’s such as Cariou to
initiate these lawsuits. See Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994). After
Fogarty, there is also an incentive for defendants to litigate infringement cases because
attorney’s fees may be available for prevailing defendants. Id. at 534.
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would provide a regime that artists could look to, and would
give more freedom to artists who use these techniques in their
work. This would encourage more creation and lessen the
bureaucracy associated with licensing images and with
defending a claim in court. Moreover, the elements of this new
transformative use question provide boundaries to fair use that
protect the limited monopoly that copyright is meant to
provide. Uses that clearly steal the image for no new artistic
purpose, with minimal objective differences, and with purely
economic intent will not pass this transformative use analysis,
and will therefore, in all likelihood, fail the fair use test. This
standard tracks the expectation of artists—as well as the
arguments presented by their lawyers—and therefore avoids the
impossible result of forcing artists to engage in a legal analysis
in order to use appropriation in a body of artwork. Adoption of
this standard ensures that artists have the freedom to create
and that the goals of the Copyright Act are respected.
CONCLUSION
Aptly touching on many of the important points in the
battle between copyright and appropriation art, Stephen E.
Weil predicts that
if our society is to continue to be enriched by the vigorous production
and distribution of original works of visual art, then visual artists
need a license to forage widely—far more widely than conventionally
interpreted copyright law might permit—in gathering the raw
materials out of which to compose their work.171

Judge Leval believed it was important to remember that
copyright is not a natural right inherent in the fabric of our
nation or moral customs.172 Instead, copyright is granted in the
Constitution as an incentive for people to create. Fair use, and
thus transformative use, is the other side of the same coin.
These doctrines protect creativity by creating space in which
authors and artists may work. This space must be protected.
And although fair use will likely remain a subjective, factbased question, some parameters must be set if the defense is
to be useful to artists in any way.

171

172

1107 (1990).

Weil, supra note 19, at 840.
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,

2013] TRANSFORMATIVE USE & THREATS TO APPROPRIATION 1551

If artists have the freedom to use images without the
restriction of having to comment on the original, the goals of
copyright will ultimately be realized. Moreover, the
requirement that the secondary work serve a distinct artistic
purpose will maintain the balance that protects the copyright
holders. Artists still must create work with a message and for a
purpose—with a goal of creating their own work—if they are to
use the images of others. For art to be productive, it must have
some message, even if the message is about art-making in
general. This standard does not legalize piracy or useless
copying. Instead, it promotes valuable art and protects artists’
prerogative to experiment, comment, and promote creativity. It
is true that “sometimes art and law don’t align well,”173 but if
the goal of copyright is to promote the arts, then when art and
law collide, it should be the law that yields.
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